While foreign policy news connoisseurs are focused on the latest developments in the Edward Snowden saga or the Benghazi scandal, something far less esoteric and secretive that ought to make every American furious and disappointed is going on with our occupation in Afghanistan. According to a report issued this week by Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction John Sopko, upwards of 40 development grants awarded in Afghanistan under various reconstruction programs administered by the military establishment in charge of the occupation have gone to private agencies with documented ties to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Sopko is a civilian whose office was mandated by Congress as a condition of continued funding for the occupation, and his investigation and research are conducted independently of the military establishment to provide adequate oversight with no conflict of interest. His report identifies the entities with ties to known enemies of the United States and makes the reasonable and moderate recommendation that the military retract the contracts; but such a straightforward and proactive response is apparently not an option with the hopeless bureaucracy that the Pentagon and its immediate subordinates have evolved into.

 

          The Pentagon’s own report issued this week, as well as statements by various spokesmen for the military offices administering the grants, have not openly denied that contracts have in fact been awarded to supporters and collaborators of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In addressing Sopko’s report and his recommendations, they have rather dryly and calmly commented that they are unable to suspend the contracts based on the evidence provided in these documents alone – as such actions would violate the “due process rights” of grant recipients, and would likely be successfully challenged in Afghani Courts. The evidence contained within Sopko’s report is classified so it is difficult to make any sort of determination regarding its sufficiency. However, according to Sopko himself, its classified nature as opposed to lack of sufficient content is what deters the military establishment from wanting to use it in Afghani Courts to retract contracts.

 

          A reasonable guttural response to this situation by most Americans would be to tear into the military establishment, questioning how its security concerns regarding the information in Sopko’s report can possibly be compatible with the practice of hiring agencies that aid and fund the enemy to build Afghan infrastructure, refurnish Afghan roads and bridges to make them less conducive to terrorist attacks and the planting of roadside bombs, and develop a US-friendly Afghan military. However, as a political scientist, I probe this far deeper than a disagreement between military administrators and civilian inspectors to support, once again, a conclusion that I have held since the day George W Bush made the announcement – invading and occupying Afghanistan was absolutely the dumbest foreign policy decision in US history.

 

          Let’s start from afar. As a social worker, I have been employed by many agencies that operate on Federal grants. I have seen $100,000s spent on expensive toys for the personal use of employees to insure all the money asked for was spent so the grant will be renewed next year. I have seen plastic surgery performed on outcome data for hours to get it to at least look like grant objectives are being met. I have seen goals that have already been met for years being purposely written as grant objectives to insure ease of requalification if a grant auditor decides to inspect progress on expected outcomes. And perhaps most importantly of all, I have seen dozens of the useless bureaucrats known as surveyors and auditors gloss over volumes of information laid right before their eyes that was grounds for grant termination and still renew grants; most of the time because they simply don’t want to do the paperwork associated with a negative finding. In the grant recipients’ defense, many of them still do a great job providing services with the grant money. The majority of these escapades are simply a necessity to circumvent the inherent disconnect from reality in the policies and operations of every Federal bureaucracy surrounding the awarding of grants. Agencies that receive grants have a rational interest in continuing to receive funding, both for their own job security and often because they are genuinely passionate about their work.

 

          If such high standards of ethics and efficiency in grant awarding and review surround civilian departments that employ ‘professionals’ whose sole job is dealing with Federal grants; expecting any sort of effectiveness in this domain from the Department of Defense as it operates on hostile, undeveloped, foreign soil is the height of absurdity. The broad reconstruction objectives rain down from Washington, DC, in many cases written by politicians and bureaucrats that have never as much as flown over an actual war zone; and the military officials handling the perpetual reports of casualties of their service members and threats of attack on their own offices simply have neither the time nor resources to adequately vet grant recipients. They skim their latest wire, let loose a few expletives regarding where they’re supposed to find local private entities in the designated area of Afghanistan that aren’t neck-deep in Taliban connections, and then follow orders and delegate the task as assigned. A report like Sopko’s doesn’t tell them anything they didn’t already know. However, unlike many civilians, they understand what they are dealing with, and that the kangaroo courts established by the same reconstruction process are crawling with Taliban sympathizers and will rule in the local contractors’ favor. Then the next wire from DC will tell them to comply with the courts’ orders so that politicians can continue to mislead Americans that the Afghan government is legitimate and sovereign. In light of all this, it is difficult to blame the generals, even for not wanting Sopko’s classified materials aired in public – they are simply cutting their losses.

 

          The larger lesson here is that we must stay out of countries where the infrastructure and development in all domains resembles a bad movie set in the 18th century Middle East. Sure, our military forces are far superior to theirs and we have no problem crushing what feeble defense they can muster and occupying them. But the absence of roads, electricity, irrigation, and even 20th century communication systems like telephone wires makes centralized government the way we imagine it simply impossible; and our superb military makes a disastrously incompetent police force as it tries to establish the authority of a government seated in one of a few urban areas over vast expanses of desert and mountains ruled by tribal relations in which loyalties are not expressed by uniform or badge. It is natural that when large sums of money are invested in such locations, the culturally dominant forces will get their hands on them and then distribute them as they see fit, with 0 concerns for the wishes of the investor as there is no capacity for recourse. It is also natural that our enemies like Osama bin Laden will seek refuge in such locations because finding and neutralizing them there is the costliest. But as we demonstrated with the very raid that killed Osama bin Laden – in a country that is allegedly our ally without informing its government or seeking permission – we are perfectly capable of neutralizing the enemy in such places without a full-blown invasion or occupation, and at a fraction of the costs.

 

          No one with any modicum of understanding genuinely believed that a US-led effort to occupy Afghanistan and then develop it so it ceases to be a haven for our enemies had any chance of success. The entire operation was nothing more than a colossal exercise in crony capitalism where military contractors and various trade entrepreneurs sought short-term profit from an emotion-inspired abuse of force and waste of lives and money by the Federal government. As we leave Afghanistan and it invariably falls back into the hands of the Taliban with our departure, my hope is that Americans for many generations remember what really happened; and give the appropriate electoral boot to any future politicians with similar agendas.

 

By: Neurotoxin

 

 

 

About the Editor:

Neurotoxin holds a dual BA in Psychology and Political Science and an MSW with a specialization in Community Organizing. Politically, he is a “structural anarchist”; a school of thought that believes in treating all power structures as facts of nature that should be accounted for but not preserved. This school of thought dictates that policy ought to be driven solely by its empirically calculated outcomes.

Neurotoxin is the co-owner of Edge of Chaos – a political podcast and blog that can be found @ www.edgeofchaospodcast.com and http://www.facebook.com/theedgeofchaos.